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DE L A  SALLE’S LAST EXPEDITION, 1684-1687 
I C H E L I E U  said of statesmen: “They are like men R condemned to  torture, with this difference only, that the 
latter are punished for their crimes and the others for  their 
merits.” Such has also been the end of the builders of the 
French Colonial Empire from Cavelier de la Salle to 
Brazza and Lyautey. It is part  of their destiny to  be re- 
warded for their services by the injustice of mediocre men 
and the vindictiveness of those in power. 
De la Salle founds a new colony, while Talon, Frontenac, 
and Colbert direct the affairs of state and uphold his ef- 
forts. On November 17, 1682, the very year of his triumph, 
Frontenac leaves Canada. In 1683, Colbert dies. T h e  reins 
of the French government pass into weak hands. In  Canada, 
a weak-minded octogenarian, Lefebre de la Barre, is ap- 
pointed governor and surrenders his power to the factions 
which Frontenac had kept in check and to the superintendent 
Duchesneau, who, since his arrival in Canada in 1675, had 
done nothing but oppose the acts of the governor. After the 
departure of Frontenac, the new officials, as has too often 
been the case in French Colonial history, made it a rule to 
adopt policies exactly contrary to  those of their more bril- 
liant and imaginative predecessors. 
De la Salle has to climb his Calvary, like Brazza and 
Lyautey. With but one thought, that of giving to  the new 
empire a solid foundation, he did not rush to Quebec and to 
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Versailles in 1682 to  get his laurel crown. H e  sent his con- 
fidant, the Recollet Father ZCnobe MembrC, who was to re- 
port to Colbert the success of the great undertaking. De la 
Salle, with characteristic unselfishness, remains on the scene 
to  strengthen the unfinished outposts of the Illinois. When 
his work there is accomplished, he prepares to leave for 
France to  request the supplies needed by the new empire. 
The  tragedy begins. Just as later Brazza was almost ac- 
cused of theft for a slight irregularity in his accounts, so is de 
la Salle accused by Duchesneau over a matter of fur pelts. 
The  incompetent L a  Barre dares send to Versailles in 
November, 1683, a report in which he accuses de la Salle “of 
creating an imaginary empire by gathering together all the 
bankrupts and good-for-nothings in the country.” H e  dis- 
charges him as governor of Fort  Frontenac. H e  has him 
forcibly ejected by his agents. H e  has all the goods in the 
fort  seized, although they were the personal property of the 
explorer. H e  strips Tonty of his command of Fort  St. Louis 
of the Illinois. Subservient to  hatreds of which he is the 
instrument, he goes so fa r  as to suggest to the Iroquois that 
they kill him. 
Colbert’s son, Seignelay, is weak, but he means well. De 
la Salle returns to France, lands a t  L a  Rochelle in Decem- 
ber, 1683, and asks for  justice. The  King restores him to 
his command, reestablishes Tonty in his post, dismisses Gov- 
ernor de la Barre, and replaces him by a new governor, 
Reni de Vrisay, Marquis de Denonville, whose first act is to 
call Tonty to the defense of Canada with the help of Indian 
tribes brought into alliance by de la Salle : the Miamis of the 
Great Lakes and the Illinois. 
But Colbert’s death has deprived France of a leader who 
knows what he wants and can have it carried out. T h e  reins 
of State no longer held by a firm hand, things go their own 
way till they come to a standstill. 
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The  organization of de la Salle’s last expedition is a typi- 
cal example of the conditions brought on by the loss of  a 
chieftain. De la Salle gives Seignelay an account of the suc- 
cessful completion of his extraordinary expedition of discov- 
ery. The  latter receives him very cordially. H e  understands 
immediately that it is necessary to exploit the new colony, 
found there a naval base, colonize it, and protect it against 
the Spaniards. The  latter did indeed consider the Gulf of 
Mexico as belonging to them alone. They had gone so far 
as to forbid the entry of any French ships. Besides Mexico, 
they possess a t  that time the territory comprising today the 
states of New Mexico, Texas, and Oklahoma. They there- 
fore menace by land and by sea the outlet of the new empire. 
If the treaty of Nimcgue actually insured peace between 
France and Spain in 1678, it was only in Europe. In  the 
West Indies and the Gulf of Mexico, the war, in fact, went 
on. The  Spaniards captured every French ship which ven- 
tured into these waters; accordingly, in 1679, a Spanish 
squadron captured a French man-of-war, making prisoners 
of its crew. Louis XIV replied by sending the fleet of 
d’EstrCes, with orders to sink or capture the Spanish squad- 
ron, and in 1683, he dispatched three men-of-war under the 
command of Gabaret. Tha t  very same year, 1683, Spain 
declared war on France and it was only through the truce of 
Ratisbonne of August 15, 1684, that  France obtained 
promise of a change in Spanish policy. 
In these circumstances, de la Salle conceives a carefully 
thought out plan for an offensive and defensive base a t  the 
mouth of the Mississippi. In  order to penetrate peacefully 
and colonize these parts one must a t  least be prepared 
against an imminent Spanish attack which was not a t  all 
improbable. Hence, a preventive offensive might become 
necessary in order to insure the security of the new terri- 
32 Robert Cavelier, Sieur de la Salle 
tories, if they were threatened. To this end, de la Salle pro- 
poses to  organize an expedition composed partly of soldiers 
for defense, partly of civilians for colonization, taking with 
them the supplies necessary for war and agriculture. De la 
Salle goes back to the old Roman formula: by the sword 
and by the plow, the sword protecting, if need be, the plow. 
De la Salle understands perfectly the situation of France in 
Europe, threatened as she is, on her frontiers. His personal 
experience tells him that he will have to recruit an army of 
natives under French command. H e  will strongly organize 
these groups of Indians which will be provided by allied and 
friendly tribes, just as, later, France organized an army with 
North African troops, then with black troops. Thus did de 
la Salle propose to organize an Indian army. H e  laid his 
plan before the King and Seignelay: an army of fifteen 
thousand men could be organized if he is granted necessary 
supplies and men: soldiers, carefully chosen and capable of 
forming the backbone of the new army, officers like Tonty, 
men like the companions of his former expeditions. H e  asks 
authority to  recruit two hundred men in France together 
with inhabitants of Santo Domingo, who were accustomed 
to the climate of these parts. 
T h e  tribes he had already organized around Fort  Fronte- 
nac and especially around Fort  St. Louis, contingents of the 
new “nations,” whom he had made his allies on his voyages 
down and up the Mississippi, would constitute the main 
part of his army. With these elements, he would establish 
a commercial and military center, sixty leagues above the 
mouth of the Mississippi, a t  the junction of the Red River, 
which river comes straight from New Biscay, the northern 
part  of Mexico, where the threatening Spaniards had estab- 
lished their extreme penetration even into the basin of the 
Mississippi, of which France had already taken possession. 
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T o  the soldiers must be added colonists and artisans nec- 
essary in the foundation of a settlement: carpenters, labor- 
ers, etc., finally missionaries must be included in the mission 
to play their spiritual r81e. Such is the plan presented by 
de la Salle, well thought out and adapted to  local circum- 
stances. I t  is approved on July 24, 1684, and on that date 
Cavelier was able to leave La  Rochelle with four ships: a 
man of war, the “Joly,” carrying thirty-six guns; a trans- 
port, named by Cavelier “L’Aimable,” loaded with ammuni- 
tion, food, and other supplies; a brig carrying six cannon, 
“La Belle,” and another one, “Le St. Franqois,” carrying 
ammunition. This last ship was captured off Santo Domingo 
by two Spanish ships, either actual buccaneers, or disguised 
as such. 
These ships carried, in addition to  their crew of seventy 
men and two hundred soldiers, about one hundred colonists, 
among whom were men of all trades engaged by de la Salle, 
a few women, two of whom were married and had children, 
and six missionaries : three Sulpicians, among whom was 
Robert’s brother, Jean Cavelier, and three Recollet fathers, 
Father Zinobe Membri,  Father Anastase Douay, and 
Father Maxime Le  Clercq. 
T h e  story of this expedition is the epic of a disaster which 
ended in murder. Such utter failure in the wake of such a 
great triumph, has its origin in the disintegration of gov- 
ernment authority in France, and the personal weakness of 
Seignelay. A certain Captain Pingault was to take com- 
mand of the “Joly” in the name of the King. H e  was not 
supposed to land, and was placed under the orders of de la 
Salle in all things except when “the safety of the vessel and 
navigation” were concerned. H e  was unfortunately replaced 
by Beaujeu. T h e  letters exchanged between the latter and 
the Minister before the departure of the expedition re- 
34 Robert Cavelier, Sieur de la Salle 
vealed the serious mistake which had been made by the Min- 
ister responsible for the appointment. From the very first 
day, there is a lack of understanding between de la Salle 
and Beaujeu, who despises this colonial boor and attempts 
with adroit insincerity a t  every turn to discredit him. As a 
captain is in full command of his ship, the perpetual con- 
flict is exceptionally serious. I t  was eventually to endanger 
the expedition. It is apparent that  the expedition is disor- 
ganized from the very beginning, and Seignelay himself re- 
alizes it so well that he writes to Beaujeu, “by the trouble 
you are making you will cause the failure of the expedition.’’ 
Still Seignelay neglects to  take energetic steps to remedy 
the evil. His  weakness was the primary cause of the death 
of de la Salle. 
On the other hand, the whole plan was based on the con- 
ception of a native army under French leadership. I t  could 
succeed only if the men chosen to lead the Indian army were 
capable of fulfilling such a delicate mission. De la Salle 
knew how to prepare them for  it, to  instill in them the 
proper spirit, and to train them as instructors and leaders 
of an army of natives. Lyautey and Mangin have always 
stressed the importance of such preparation, which requires 
special training. Now the discord which reigned on board, 
fomented by Beaujeu’s intrigues, undermines from the very 
first an element indispensable to success : the unquestioned 
prestige of the chief. And although about ten officers and 
volunteers, first among them Henri  Joutel, represented a 
sound element, the others seem ridiculously unfit for so great 
an undertaking. These soldiers of the King were military 
castoffs, “a very poor lot, and hardly fit for service,” accord- 
ing to  the reports of the day. Instead of being carefully 
chosen to  be the leaders of an army of fifteen thousand 
men, they were themselves but an undisciplined rabble, ripe 
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for  desertion and treason. This situation gives Beaujeu 
ample opportunity to  undermine the authority of Cavelier 
and he takes advantage of it from the beginning.15 
Other unforeseen difficulties might have been overcome 
by de la Salle if such serious mistakes had not doomed him 
beforehand to failure. Surrounded with men who were 
either hostile or  incompetent, he could not possibly succeed, 
and his failure was to turn into a disaster. H e  had taken 
the latitude of the mouth of the Mississippi, which he must 
find; but not the longitude, which could not then be calcu- 
lated; and that was the reason why he was to be led quite a 
distance to  the west of the river. The  probable landing place 
seems to have been four degrees to the west of the mouth of 
the Mississippi. For  some fifty years, cartographers, un- 
certain in their knowledge of longitude, had this mouth of 
the Mississippi located farther west, toward Spanish Mex- 
ico. In the letter which de la Salle writes to Seignelay on 
March 4, 1685, immediately after landing, he reports hav- 
ing noticed the main mouth of the delta on January 6 a t  a 
point thirty leagues to the northeast, that is to say, in 
approximately the exact position; and he adds, “the pilots 
of His Majesty’s ship . . . were mistaken and what we 
saw on January 6 was indeed the main entrance to the river 
which we were seeking.” But he lands, believing that the 
river a t  the end of the bay is a “channel of Colbert River,” 
and fearing to “spend the rest of the winter trying to work 
my way toward the east, from which direction the winds 
blow almost continually and drive the currents toward the 
west.” H e  asks “M. de Beaujeu to go and explore that 
other river’s mouth,” to which Beaujeu pays no heed. The  
responsibility for  the serious mistake made in the choice of 
landing-place has been widely discussed. M. Lauvriire cred- 
its the error to Beaujeu and his pilots, although he points 
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out the uncertainty of the cartography of this region before 
the year 1770, when the chronometer made possible the cal- 
culation of longitude.“ It seems that on this one point the 
mistake was excusable : “The constant similarity and low 
level of the coast, the shallowness of the water, the narrow- 
ness of the entrance to bays,” says one observer, make it 
quite admissible, considering the inability to calculate longi- 
tude. De  la Salle was right; the pilots were wrong, but are 
excusable; the mistake would have been rectified if Beaujeu 
had done his duty by going to explore the point indicated. 
But de la Salle might have reached it later, with some delay, 
i f ,  besides the miscalculations, inherent in the organization 
of his expedition, there had not been another mistake of the 
same order as the one which led them to believe that the 
climate of New France was the same as that of the mother 
country. De  la Salle and his companions had explored the 
delta region of the Mississippi in the spring. Accustomed 
as they were to the severity of the northern climate, they 
had been delighted by the enchantment of the months of 
March and April, so severe in Canada, but so mild in 
Louisiana. They were not prepared for the other side of 
the picture, and had no idea of what was in store for them 
during the three years they were to spend in these unknown 
shores of the Gulf of Mexico. Torr id  summers, tropical 
marsh fevers, scurvy, snakes, poisonous fruits, the Indians 
along the shore, who like the Iroquois of the north were 
the most hostile and cruel of all the tribes. Such was the 
lot of the two hundred soldiers and the colonists who had 
been led to expect an earthly paradise. Inexperienced, ill- 
adapted to the task, ill-recruited, rendered hostile to de la 
Salle during the crossing by the intrigues of Beaujeu, 
d’Aigron, and Minet, most of these men were bound to  
become sick, mutinous, and trouble makers. 
